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Abstract 
The Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is becoming a more available and popular way of communicating for 
Internet users. This also applies to Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems and merging these two have already proven to be 
successful (e.g. Skype). Even the existing standards of VoIP provide an assurance of security and Quality of 
Service (QoS), however, these features are usually optional and supported by limited number of implementations. 
As a result, the lack of mandatory and widely applicable QoS and security guaranties makes the contemporary 
VoIP systems vulnerable to attacks and network disturbances. In this paper we are facing these issues and 
propose the SecMon system, which simultaneously provides a lightweight security mechanism and improves 
quality parameters of the call. SecMon is intended specially for VoIP service over P2P networks and its main 
advantage is that it provides authentication, data integrity services, adaptive QoS and (D)DoS attack detection. 
Moreover, the SecMon approach represents a low-bandwidth consumption solution that is transparent to the 
users and possesses a self-organizing capability. The above-mentioned features are accomplished mainly by 
utilizing two information hiding techniques: digital audio watermarking and network steganography. These 
techniques are used to create covert channels that serve as transport channels for lightweight QoS measurement’s 
results.  Furthermore, these metrics are aggregated in a reputation system that enables best route path selection in 
the P2P network. The reputation system helps also to mitigate (D)DoS attacks, maximize performance and 
increase transmission efficiency in the network. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
During the recent years, P2P (Peer-to-Peer) systems have become popular in many 
domains, such as filesharing (e.g. Napster; Gnutella; eDonkey), content and software 
distribution (e.g. BitTorrent), and voice and video communication (e.g. Skype, Joost). The 
latter, in particular, has conquered the communication-via-Internet scene and for many end 
users Skype is the first choice when using the computer for calling, rather than VoIP based on 
classical standards (e.g. SIP or H.323). It is expected that P2P systems and related principles 
will dominate future networks, which makes P2P the given choice, for the system proposed in 
this paper: SecMon. 
As opposed to client-server systems, peers (the nodes of a P2P system) are acting as client, 
server and potentially even relay at the same time as they form an overlay network. Structured 
P2P systems distinguish between different types of peers in order to avoid scalability 
problems. An important feature of P2P systems is self-organisation, which amongst others 
implies that a peer can enter or leave the network at any time without jeopardising the overall 
functionality.  
For real-time services like VoIP, security and performance are in general antagonists: 
security mechanisms impose overheads affecting performance, which may make users switch 
off security measures in order to get better performance [28]. On the other hand, performance 
monitoring can enable the detection of a security attack, e.g., modification and data tampering 
by increase of a transmission delay or jitter. In this paper, security mechanisms are used to 
help with performance and security monitoring.   
As mentioned earlier proposed SecMon system is intended for VoIP service deployed in 
P2P networks. It is characterized by providing security services such as authentication and 
data integrity based on a lightweight mechanism. Moreover it enables adaptive QoS and 
(D)DoS attacks detection. It is also a low bandwidth consumption solution, and what is very 
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important is that it is transparent to users while possessing self-organizing capability. These 
features are achieved by utilizing two information hiding techniques, namely digital audio 
watermarking and network steganography. These techniques are used to create covert 
channels that serve as transport channels for lightweight QoS measurement’s results.   
As mentioned above, this paper considers VoIP service in P2P overlay networks and in 
this environment the trust management will be used for misbehaviour detection and nodes 
evaluation. Such evaluation allows creating a long-term node assessment called a reputation. 
It is a mean that will be used for providing incentives for a good behaviour of nodes and 
metric, which allows for choosing a more truthful node. In SecMon we also utilize a 
reputation maintaining system in order to detect any untrustworthy behaviour in the network 
that interferes with QoS for a VoIP media transmission. In result, in SecMon originators of 
such activities are isolated. The goal of the reputation management is to motivate nodes to be 
well cooperative which would improve the network security and performance. In the proposed 
system the reputation model will be used to improve routing path selection for media 
transmission as well as for efficient sending of QoS monitoring and security information. 
The earlier project AutoMon that has been sponsored by the European Network of 
Excellence Euro-NGI developed a P2P-based monitoring infrastructure [18], exploiting self-
organisation and implementing autonomic networking facilities with focus on generating 
quality feedback on behalf of the users. Also the earlier authors’ research has advocated end-
to-end quality monitoring based on passive measurements, e.g. of application-perceived 
throughput [5, 6, 7, 10, 18]. This monitoring principle requires a continuous exchange of the 
monitoring results. On the other hand, the use of the suitable summary statistics of packets 
transmission such as average and standard deviation makes the related monitoring overhead 
lightweight, especially when it can be piggy-backed onto existing data transfers. The 
proposed approach enables this in a new way. As pointed out before, the lightweight 
monitoring targeted by this paper matches well the limited capacity of the covert channels. 
Moreover, the less capacity needed for performance management, the more is left for 
providing security: the better the chance for both to coexist. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we circumscribe the SecMon architecture, 
node model and a general communication flow between functional blocks. Sections from 3 to 
7 describe each defined functional block operations in details. Finally, Section 8 concludes 
our work. 
 
2. SecMon Architecture 
In every Peer-to-Peer network one may distinguish two layers: the Service Layer which 
covers functionality of data routing, network discovery, self-organizing logic and a particular 
service itself, such as VoIP; and the Transport Layer as an inherent part of an underlying 
network, providing data transportation service. SecMon system introduces an intermediate 
layer which interacts with the Service and Transport layers, as shown in Fig. 1. The detailed 
description of and Transport and Service layer focuses only on interfaces towards the SecMon 
system.  
SecMon system is designed for delivering lightweight security and QoS guaranties in P2P 
multimedia networks, in particular VoIP service. It supports the routing process that 
influences the choice of the best end-to-end paths between two chosen nodes (Source and 
Destination in Fig. 1), respecting measurements and monitoring of QoS and security along the 
VoIP call path. The SecMon Layer acts as intermediating block and it is implemented on 
every SecMon-aware peer node.  
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Fig. 1. P2P overlay network composition for SecMon 
 
2.1 Node Model 
Apart from the Data Plane which directly refers to data transmission, all P2P network 
functionality is organized inside the Control Plane. The SecMon system aims to improve and 
extend the Control Plane of P2P networks with lightweight security and QoS features. 
The P2P network is composed of a certain number of nodes and constitutes a three-layer 
network model, which is directly reflected in the functional construction of every SecMon 
node. The node model is depicted in Fig. 2.  
 
 
Fig. 2. SecMon Layer in a Control Plane of P2P network stack 
 
The SecMon system performs several different operations based on the interaction with 
outer layers. Inside such a system one may identify internal functions which are specific and 
organized within the following functional blocks: 
• Covert Channels Block (CCB) – two sub-channels are used to exchange QoS and 
Security Measurement data between nodes along the communication path. It is used 
by SMB and QMB; 
• Security Management Block (SMB) – is in charge of evaluation of lightweight 
security measurement data, perform data securing with steganography and 
watermarking. It delivers metrics to RMB and IDS; 
• QoS management Block (QMB) – is in charge of measurements and evaluation of 
lightweight QoS metrics. It delivers metrics to RMB and IDS; 
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• Intrusion Detection System Block (IDS) – anomaly detection system, is obliged to 
rise alerts in a case of attack detection and report it to RMB;  
• Reputation Management Block (RMB) – collects and aggregates metrics coming 
from QMB, SMB, and IDS in order to support a best path-path selection in a P2P 
routing process.  
 
The SecMon system interactions are realized by means of internal and external interfaces, 
which have been enumerated in Fig. 3. For an already established VoIP session the SecMon 
system operations are described by the following messages: 
 
 
Fig. 3. Message flow between SecMon functional blocks 
 
1. Sending/Receiving hidden lightweight QoS and Security measurement throughout 
data transportation, taking advantage of covert channels and regaining the same 
bandwidth occupation. 
2. Writing lightweight Security measurement data into covert channels. 
3. Reading lightweight Security measurement data from covert channels. 
4. Writing lightweight QoS measurement data into covert channels. 
5. Reading lightweight QoS measurement data from covert channels. 
6. Reading measurements parameters (e.g. packet losses, jitter, and throughput) for 
network performance. 
7. Delivering Security metrics to RMB.  
8. Delivering Security metrics to IDS. 
9. Delivering QoS metrics to IDS. 
10. Delivering QoS metrics to RMB.  
11. Alerting about (D)DoS attacks to the RMB. 
12. Request for the best next hop selection from P2P service layer to RMB 
13. Indication answer for the best next hop selection in RMB. 
14. Reputation sharing between nodes, with additional communication protocol. 
 
Every SecMon block performs a set of specific operations which are described in details 
with the following subsections. 
 
3. QoS Management Block: Lightweight Monitoring and Related Time Constants 
The task of lightweight monitoring consists in discovering performance problems in an 
efficient way, which means that a rather small amount of monitoring data should be sent and 
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processed in order to derive indications on performance problems. Still, the complete data 
stream of interest should be observed at different points in the network. These requirements 
actually exclude active measurements that may impose a significant extra load on links and 
nodes while merely delivering performance snapshots [7]. Moreover, the proposed method 
needs to be robust with regards to clock synchronization problems. 
In [10] a method for comparative throughput measurements has been proposed, building 
upon packet or byte counts on short time scales, i.e. for small averaging intervals of length ∆T. 
From comparisons of the sender’s and receiver’s throughput histograms, the existence and 
severity of a bottleneck is seen. Experience has shown that a useful averaging interval should 
capture at least five to ten packets, while an observation interval ∆W should capture at least 
ten averaging intervals. The observation interval can be moved in a jumping or moving 
window fashion. The method was amongst others used for describing the throughput 
performance of mobile links [5, 7], and it became obvious that changes of average and 
standard deviation of the throughput averaged over ∆T and observed during ∆W between 
sender and receiver clearly describe the impact of the bottleneck. This impact can be 
formulated in utility functions [19], which correlate well with voice Quality of Experience 
through comparably simple formulae [25, 26]. The statistical calculations can be implemented 
in a very efficient way using a ring-buffer mechanism [24]. 
The class of service supported by the SecMon architecture is particularly user-oriented, 
which makes it necessary to take user-imposed constraints into account. According to a 
usability analysis [21], glitches of more than 100 ms might be perceived as delays. An 
average user may loose concentration on a stalling process after about one second. After four 
seconds, things are getting boring for the user [22]. Users are in general not willing to wait 
more than ten seconds; otherwise, the risk of abandoning the process is large [21, 22]. The 
challenge for the SecMon architecture consists in ensuring a reasonably good user perception, 
which means  
• The discovery of performance and security problems preferably within the user 
reaction time of one second, 
• The resolution of such problems within a couple of seconds before the user starts 
thinking about abandoning the process, e.g. by signalling towards the source so 
that it can adapt itself to the new conditions, or by finding another route, which we 
focus on in the sequel. 
 
The combination of its properties and the requirements listed above make the proposed 
lightweight monitoring method a promising candidate for performance evaluation within 
SecMon. Its light weight is seen from the following example: Assume (a) ∆T = 500 ms, 
allowing for the discovery of performance problems on at least that time scale; (b) a sliding 
window, which means that each ∆T, monitoring data is sent from sender to receiver in order 
to be compared. Assume a coding of 1 B per piece of data (for instance, average and standard 
deviation of the packet rate during ∆W); we arrive at a data rate of merely 32 bps. 
 
4. Covert Channels Block: Information Hiding Techniques 
Information hiding has two sub-disciplines and they are: steganography and digital 
watermarking. The general difference between these two techniques is that the aim of 
steganography is to keep the existence of the information secret and in watermarking making 
it imperceptible. 
Steganography is a process of hiding secret data inside other, normally transmitted data, 
so in ideal situation, anyone scanning data will fail to know it contains covert data. In modern 
digital steganography, the hidden data is inserted into redundant (provided but often 
unneeded) data, e.g. fields in communication protocols, graphic image, etc. For TCP/IP 
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steganography (or network stenography) the most important fact is that few fields in the 
packet’s headers are changed during transit. 
For digital watermarking the most important application for this project is the ability of 
embedding the authentication and integrity watermark. We can embed data that is similar to a 
cryptographic hash, into voice samples. This hash will be invisible and inseparable from the 
data. 
 
4.1 Motivation: Secure and Lightweight Transfer of Quality/Security Monitoring Data 
By using abovementioned information hiding techniques we will be able to create two 
covert sub-channels. In this way we may achieve a solution that does not consume 
transmission bandwidth, because the control bits (that allow distinguishing what data is 
transferred) are transmitted in a covert (steganographic) channel and data (quality/security 
monitoring data) is inseparably bound to voice content in a form of digital watermark. Such a 
usage of covert sub-channels gives opportunity to exchange different types of data (e.g., 
monitoring information) but it also provides security verification of the transmission source 
and the content sent (authentication and integrity). Using these covert channels is presented 
way is described in details in [1] and [2] and will be applied accordingly. 
 
4.2 Network Steganography and Its Application 
In SecMon for VoIP service we will exploit unused/optional fields in IP/UDP/RTP 
packets because these protocols are used all IP telephony implementations. Covert data is 
usually inserted into redundant fields (provided, but often unneeded) for abovementioned 
protocols and then transferred to the receiving side. As described in [11] and [12] the IP 
header alone posses a few fields that are available to be used as a covert channel, and we can 
also deploy unused UDP and RTP protocols fields. The total capacity of those fields exceeds 
32 bits per packet. 
Furthermore, we can distribute the control bits among these fields in a predetermined 
fashion (this pattern can be exchanged during a signalling phase of a conversation). In the 
chosen fields we will only transmit the header (control bits) of our protocol with the use of 
steganography technique. Because the header consists of only a few bits per packet, such a 
type of transmission is potentially hard to discover.  
 
4.3 Audio Watermarking  
The primary application of audio watermarking was to preserve copyright and/or 
intellectual property protection, sometimes called DRM (Digital Right Management). 
However, this technique can also be used to create effective a covert channel inside a digital 
content. Generally, the audio watermarking algorithm consists of two phases: embedding the 
digital watermark into the voice at the source, and then its extraction at the destination place. 
In IP telephony we can distinguish those phases too; as soon as the conversation begins, 
certain information is embedded into the voice samples and sent through the communication 
channel. Then, the digital watermark is extracted from a voice stream before it reaches a caller.  
Currently, there are a number of audio watermarking algorithms available. The most 
popular methods that can be utilized in real-time communication for VoIP service include: 
LSB (Least Significant Bit), QIM (Quantization Index Modulation), Echo Hiding, DSSS 
(Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum), and FHSS (Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum). For 
these algorithms the bandwidth of available covert channels depends mainly on the sampling 
rate and the type of audio material being encoded. In [13], research results have shown that 
for LSB communication rate is 1 kbps per 1 kHz (e.g. for 8 kHz sampling rate the capacity is 
8 kbps), echo hiding around 16 bps, while DSSS achieved 4 bps. Also experiments in [13] 
have shown that DSSS method’s bandwidth is about 22.5 bps, FHSS 20.2 bps, echo hiding 
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22.3 bps and LSB around 4 kbps. Based on those results one can clearly see that, besides LSB 
watermarking (which is easy to detect and erase and that is why will not be considered here), 
the rest of the methods achieved a covert channel bandwidth range from a few to tens of bits 
per second. 
Moreover, most audio watermarking algorithms for the real-time communication are 
designed to survive the typical non-malicious operations like: low bit rate audio compression, 
codec changes, DA/AD conversion, or packet loss. For example, in [15], the watermarking 
scheme developed at the Fraunhofer IPSI (Institut Integrierte Publikations und 
Informationssysteme) was tested for different compression methods. Results revealed that a 
large simultaneous capacity and robustness depend on the scale of the codec compression. 
When the compression rate is high (1:53), the digital watermark is robust only when we 
embed about 1 bps. With a lower compression rate we can obtain about 30 bps, whereas the 
highest data rate was 48 bps with good, robust transparent and complexity parameters. 
 
5. Security Management Block 
In this functional block of the SecMon system, the lightweight security mechanism will 
operate. This security mechanism will be implemented analogously as defined in [1]. The 
main concept is based on shared secret scheme – certain tokens (in form of hashes) are 
calculated locally and then sent to the other communication side, where they are verified. In 
this way we gain source authentication and data integrity. Moreover, we can also include 
signalling messages security as a post-factum verification method as defined in [1]. 
Additionally, QoS monitoring data will also be secured, as defined in [2]. 
 
6. Reputation Management Block 
The reputation term is defined as a perceived grade of trustworthiness to a particular peer 
created by its historical behaviour during observations and interactions with third party peers 
in the given context and time. This definition describes a concept of peer’s reputation 
expressed by a level of aggregated trust exchanged and shared between other peers. 
Reputation tends to represent generalized opinions in a local group of peers. As the reputation 
may comprise an aggregated trust of several network nodes, it becomes a very valuable metric 
supporting the P2P routing process [4]. In particular the trust has a context, which refers to a 
specific environment. For SecMon we use the Reputation Management Block to create a trust 
to the peering nodes, which may influence on the network reliability, expressed by QoS 
parameters and the Security level.  
Presented in Fig. 4, Reputation Management Block is used in SecMon for end-to-end 
routing support in P2P overlay network. Thanks to the ability of keeping a historical 
knowledge, the reputations system is eligible to mitigate (D)DoS attacks, maximize 
performance and increase transmission efficiency in the network.  
In SecMon the reputation block operates on sets of information, which are conveyed 
inside the covert channels. The first is related to QoS metrics of the lightweight monitoring 
approach and the second refers to security metrics. Based on these the IDS block feeds the 
RMB with (D)DoS attack reports. Those parameters are monitored by far-end and all 
intermediates nodes along the communication path, and are used to build an Evidence 
Repository. Reports are a source of data for Context Reputation Evaluation where 
Performance and Security Service Reputations are calculated.  
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Fig. 4. Reputation Management Block for SecMon. 
 
The Performance Service Reputation (PSR) for QoS expresses reliability in the network 
and is related to the typical quality threats for voice: 
• Lost voice samples and packets may imply cracks in and drop-outs of the voice, if no 
interpolation is effective. Drop-outs longer than one second might entail user reaction. 
The impact of loss can be seen from changes of the average throughput during ∆W 
between sender and receiver (or two arbitrary nodes along the path). 
• Delayed voice samples that do not exceed the jitter buffer are uncritical; otherwise, the 
result is similar to loss. The impact of jitter can be seen from changes of the standard 
deviation of the throughput with averaging and observation interval ∆T and ∆W, 
respectively. 
• Too large jitter buffers destroy the feeling of interactivity, but provide the 
management with some more time to (re-)act before the user actually feels the 
problems. 
 
The Security Service Reputation (SSR) represents the level of trust for the communicating 
P2P nodes. Security considerations in the SecMon system are based on the information hiding 
paradigm. A digital watermarking delivers data integrity and end-to-end authentication. The 
integrity monitoring and verification may be performed by every node being along the path. 
This feature allows detecting any malicious activity in the network such as: 
• Man-in-the-middle attacks: packet payload modifications, packet retransmission, reply 
attack, packets reordering, (D)DoS attack.  
• Appearing of packet chains in the network, which are not related to the existing 
sessions, indicating that unauthorized packets in the network consume network 
resources. 
 
The SSR reflects an opinion on positive and malicious nodes activity. Based on the 
knowledge coming from evidence repository, the SSR metric is evaluated in order to take 
preventing actions.  
The Reputation-based Route Recommendation function is in charge of indicating the best 
next hop peer along the path regarding the SSR and PSR values. It interacts with the routing 
process in the P2P Service Layer supporting VoIP service reliability. Reputation Management 
Block supports decisions for P2P network resulting in an efficient and best path selection, 
path re-establishing by selecting alternative routes, misbehaving nodes isolation and service 
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reputation sharing. The reputation may be shared in the local neighbourhood reinforcing the 
efficient and secure routing. 
The reputation service changes in time reacting with possible actions for any detected 
network issues. In case of alarms triggered by QoS degradation or a security attack, it is 
reflected by undertaken actions (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Service reputation metrics with a characteristic peer’s behaviour and short term 
reputation system reaction  
PSR - QoS 
acceptable 
SSR –  positive 
hash verification 
Conclusion Short term reputation system 
reaction 
Yes Yes Good reputation Monitoring 
Yes No Security attack Re-establish new session, isolate 
affecting nodes  
No Yes Jitter problem Share reputation with other 
nodes in order to omit nodes and 
balance network overloaded 
nodes  
No No Data losses, network 
link failure, (D)DoS 
attack 
Re-establish new session 
 
6.1 Service Reputation Evaluation 
For SecMon, the reputation evaluation method follows Liu’s [17] approach. Based on its 
adaptation to the peer-to-peer environment [4] the reputation system takes advantage of Own 
Experience OE and second-hand information, which comes from the adjoining peers. The 
reputation evaluation considers past experience and recommendation reputation of voters 
(recommends). We define two types of second-hand information, related to the immediate 
nodes and cumulative reputation describing aggregated reputation of the closest nodes’ 
neighbourhood. The second-hand messages are exchanged on demand of the interested nodes. 
In order to detect malicious behaviour and any anomalies in the information, second-hand 
recommendations are validated by a statistical correlation approach. 
In SecMon we defined security and performance reputation, SSR and PSR respectively. 
However, though they reflect two different kinds of activity in the network, the evaluation 
method is the same for both metrics and corresponds to the Service Reputation SR. 
Service Reputation evolves in time n and for exemplary Fig. 5 is determined by the 
following equations: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Information Reputation IR represents credibility of a node recommending other peers. 
Recommendations V come from immediate nodes in the network and reflect the service 
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Fig. 5. Reputation path building  
 
In order to create the Reputation Path RP, which goes throughout nodes B and A, a 
Cumulative Path CP is first calculated: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. IDS (Intrusion Detection System) Block: Attack Detection Module 
Within the SecMon architecture the detection module (IDS) receives input from the QoS 
and Security Management systems. There are two basic approaches for the attack detection: 
• Signature-based detection: these techniques assume the existence of a database with 
all attack definitions (i.e. signatures). The detection mechanism monitors the 
communications running in the network and compares them against the entries of the 
signature database. These techniques are efficient when signatures definitions are 
simple. They usually include packet attributes which can be easily checked. The major 
drawbacks of these techniques are: the high rate of the false positive alarms, the 
impossibility to detect flooding attacks based on packets similar to the legitimates 
ones;  
• Anomaly-based detection: these techniques assume that in the real world, the 
malicious attack behaviours progress over the time, which makes the attacks 
impossible to be foreseen, and consequently detected using the signature techniques. 
In this regard, these techniques try to build a reference model of the legitimate traffic 
and raise the alarm anytime the monitored traffic violates this model. Thus, they take 
the opposite approach from signature techniques. If the model tightly defines the 
legitimate traffic, it can yield an increased number of false positive alarms. On the 
other hand, if the model loosely defines the legitimate traffic, it can yield an increased 
number of false negative alarms. Therefore, one challenge of these techniques is to 
find out the right set of traffic characterization parameters, in order to trade-off 
between those two types of false alarms. Another challenge is to keep the legitimate 
traffic model updated with the daily emerging applications.  The main advantage of 
these techniques is the capacity to detect the newest attacks, even when they are 
unknown. 
 
The main types of models used for anomaly detection are the following: 
• Behaviour-based model: which relies on a selected set of traffic parameters whose 
domain of values is learned through monitoring the attack-free traffic on the network 
over a predefined period. If one of the parameters’ values overcomes a predefined 
threshold value, the detection system raises an alarm. The sensitivity and accuracy of 
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these models depend on: the quality of the chosen set of traffic parameters, the 
threshold values, and the granularity of the learning period (e.g. daily, weekly).  
• Standard-based model: is using the standard specification of communication 
protocols and the traffic specifications to build an abstract model of the valid traffic. 
This model can guarantee no false positive alarms, and necessitate a low rate for the 
model update. It only prevents attacks that violate the standards for communication. 
The main drawback is the high granularity of monitoring, which needs to be done at 
the connection level. Consequently, this model requires more resources for processing 
and storage, for a given level of performance.  
• Misbehaviour detection: this category meets the characteristics from both categories 
presented above. These techniques model the malicious behaviour, rather than the 
good one and operate a detection procedure analogous that for the signature based 
detection. The main challenge of this category is to find out the proper malicious 
traffic characteristics which can assure the attack detection from its first stages. 
 
Once an attack has been detected, the SecMon detection module should run the attack 
characterization task before the reputation system is notified. Attack characterization aims at 
the definition of the attack’s context (w.r.t. offending traffic and the agents of attack). This 
task yields the input for the SecMon response mechanisms: the reputation system. Therefore, 
the quality of the attack characterization outcome can influence the performance of the 
response mechanisms (e.g. collateral losses). 
The main properties of the underlying detection system are the accuracy and the 
timeliness. The accuracy is the property of the system to correctly detect the attacks. The 
accuracy is measured in number of detection errors achieved by a detection system within a 
given period. The two categories of detection errors, which we will also take into 
consideration further on, are false positive and false negative errors.   
The timeliness is the property of a detection system to promptly detect the attacks. Since 
the majority of attacks require some time in order to succeed, a detection window has been 
defined, within which the detection mechanisms shall work for the early alarm notification. 
Obviously, the detection window size depends on the type of attack. As soon as the attacks 
are detected within the detection window, the countermeasures taken by the response system 
are more effective. When an attack is detected early, the response system can make the attack 
transparent to the end users, and even avoid the protected network service disruption. Even 
when the attack is detected late, its negative effects can be reduced and limited.  
The overall performance of the detection system depends on its localization. Generally 
speaking, the accuracy of detection is depreciating proportionally with the distance to the 
protected network service/resource. This is due the fact that the detection system can only 
have a complete view of the traffic of the attack close to the protected resource.  
Moreover, when detection mechanisms are applied in the network core, they should be 
less complex, in order to fit the limited resources there. Consequently, the accuracy of 
detection could be even more diminished. On the other part, when applied close to the 
potential source of the attack, the detection mechanisms could be quite complex, because the 
amount of traffic seen at the source of an attack is moderately low, even during the attack. 
While placing the detection mechanisms close to the potential target seems to be better 
solution, the response mechanisms are more effective and incur limited collateral effects when 
acting close to the source of the attack. However, applying the response mechanisms in the 
core of the network allows a good trade-off between the costs of the response mechanisms 
deployment on the high scale and the collateral effects it can produce. 
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Unfortunately, securing a distributed reactive system proved to be a more complex 
process and more difficult to achieve, than for an autonomous one (a reactive system whose 
both mechanisms for detection and response are collocated). 
 
8. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper a lightweight approach for monitoring and managing of QoS and security 
(SecMon) is introduced and discussed. It is also intended to be used for reputation-based 
routing in VoIP P2P overlay networks. SecMon implements an additional layer between P2P 
overlay and (IP-based) transport layer. Moreover, functional blocks of SecMon have been 
described, which comprise QoS management, security management, IDS, reputation 
management and covert channels for exchanging management data with other SecMon-
enabled peers. It was shown that the latter implements a lightweight solution for QoS 
management in the sense that no extra capacity needs to be allocated to the monitoring as long 
as the corresponding data rate remains below some tens of bps, which seems to be feasible. 
The security management will apply tokens in form of hashes, and the IDS will mitigate 
(D)DoS attacks of the type flood by the anomaly-based detection built on a behaviour-based 
model. The core functionality supporting the routing process on the P2P or service layer is the 
reputation system, taking into account inputs from QoS and security management as well as 
from the IDS. As the SecMon system offers possibilities to apply attack detection 
mechanisms (in the form of the reputation-based routing) right in the core of the network, its 
specific IDS system will allow a good trade-off between the costs of the response mechanisms 
deployment on the high scale and the collateral effects it can produce. 
So far, this paper has introduced a concept of the system which needs to be parameterised, 
implemented and validated, initially by simulations. For instance, critical timescales in the 
system need to be linked to the monitoring facilities, while the reputation management block 
will need to take both long-term, ”static” and short-term, ”dynamic” [24] performance results 
into account. The output of the reputation management has to be delivered according to the 
timescale imposed by the goal for the discovery of performance problems, around one second. 
Finally, the QoS and security blocks need to act on the level of seconds as described above in 
order to assure satisfactory end user performance. In this context, the underlying model for 
the discovery of QoS and IDS problems needs to be specified; one candidate for this is a 
statistical change point detection algorithm. In the medium term, an implementation involving 
real users and applications is target in order to demonstrate the viability of the SecMon 
approach. 
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